The Battle of Midway is a decisive carrier against carrier between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Navy which took place near Midway Atoll between June 4 and June 7, 1942. The IJN launch a surprise invasion to Midway Island as part of Admiral Yamamoto's plan to extend Japan's defensive perimeters, a lesson they have learned from the Doolittle Raid, while luring the USN remaining carriers and crush them, but the Americans managed to decipher the coded message from the Japanese and make this operation as their own surprise attack. This battle was one of the most pivotal engagements in World War II which change the course of the war.
The Objective/The Order of Battle
The occupation of Midway Island was codenamed 'Operation MI’; this operation was carried out by the IJN's 1st Fleet, the 2nd Fleet and the 6th Fleet. The 1st fleet commanded by Admiral Yamamoto was divided into two main groups, the Main Body composed of Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu from BatDiv 1, light carrier Houshou from escorted by destroyer Yuukaze from the 3rd CarDiv, seaplane tenders Chiyoda and Nisshin, light cruiser Sendai of DesRon 3, 4 destroyers from DesDiv 11 and 4 destroyers from DesDiv 19 with 2 oil tankers, Yamato was designated as overall flagship of the fleet, they will administer the both Operation MI and Operation AL near Japan and will served as the second striking force. The Mobile Striking Force or the Kido Butai commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, Kido Butai composed of Akagi and Kaga from the 1st CarDiv and Hiryuu and Souryuu from the 2nd CarDiv, they were escorted by battleships Kirishima and Haruna from BatDiv 3, heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma from CruDiv 8, light cruiser Nagara of DesRon 10, 4 destroyers from DesDiv 4, 3 destroyers from DesDiv 10, and 4 destroyers from DesDiv 17 with 5 oil tankers escorted by Akigumo, Akagi was designated as flagship of the group, Kido Butai was ordered to strike Midway Island and provide cover for the invasion force, the group was also to strike USN carriers once they will show themselves.
The 2nd Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Kondo was also divided into four groups, the Second Strike Force composed of light carrier Zuihou from the 3rd CarDiv escorted by destroyer Mikazuki, battleships Kongou and Hiei from BatDiv 3, heavy cruisers Atago and Choukai from CruDiv 4, heavy cruisers Myoukou and Haguro from CruDiv 5, light cruiser Yura of DesRon 4, 4 destroyers from DesDiv 3, and 3 destroyers from DesDiv 9 with 4 oil tankers and repair ship Akashi, Atago was designated as flagship of the main force, the group will administer the invasion force near Japan and will serve as the second striking force. The Midway Occupation Force commanded by Rear Admiral Tanaka, which composed of 12 transport ships with 3 patrol boats and 1 oiler tanker escorted by light cruiser Jintsuu, of DesRon 2, 2 destroyers from DesDiv 15, 4 destroyers from DesDiv 16, and 4 destroyers from DesDiv 18, seaplane tender Chitose and Kamikawa Maru from 11th Seaplane Tender Division escorted by destroyer Hayashio and 1 patrol boat, Jintsuu was designated as flagship of the group, the transport ships will carry 5000 troops to Midway Island. The Midway Close-Support Force commanded by Vice Admiral Kurita, which composed of Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya and Kumano from CruDiv 7 and 2 destroyers from DesDiv 8 with 1 attached oil tanker, Kumano was designated as flagship of the group, they were ordered to assault Midway Island for the invasion force. And the Minesweeper Group commanded by CO. Sadatomo, the group composed of 4 minesweepers, 3 submarine-chasers, 1 supply ship and 2 cargo ships to support the invasion force for the operation.
The 6th Fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Komatsu, which composed of light cruiser Katori, submarine tender Yasukuni Maru of SubRon 3, 4 submarines directly attached to SubRon 3, 3 submarines from SubDiv 13, submarine tender Rio de Janairo Maru of SubRon 5, 4 submarines from SubDiv 19, and 4 submarines from SubDiv 30, Katori was designated flagship of the fleet, the fleet was ordered to scout the area of Midway and provide information for the 1st and 2nd Fleet such as weather condition and enemy activities while Katori and the submarine tenders stayed behind at Kwajalein. Overall, the IJN combined fleet is composed of 4 standard carriers, 2 light carriers, 7 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 38 destroyers and 15 submarines with 4 seaplane-tenders, 2 submarine-tenders and 40 miscellaneous ships were involved in Operation MI.
The USN assigned Task Force 16 and Task Force 17 for this mission, TF-16 was commanded by Rear Admiral Spruance, the task force is composed of USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8 of Task Group 16.5 escorted by heavy cruisers USS Minneapolis CA-36, USS New Orleans CA-32, USS Vincennes CA-44, USS Northampton CA-26, USS Pensacola CA-24, and light cruiser USS Atlanta CL-51 of Task Group 16.2, Task Group 16.4 which composed of 4 destroyers from DesRon 1 and 5 destroyers from DesRon 6, with 1 oil tankers escorted by destroyers USS Blue DD-387 and USS Ralph Talbot DD-390. TF-17 was commanded by Rear Admiral Fletcher, the task force is composed of USS Yorktown CV-5 of Task Group 16.5 escorted by USS Astoria CA-34 and USS Portland CA-33 of Task Group 17.2, Task Group 17.4 which composed 5 destroyers from DesRon 2 and 1 destroyer from DesDiv 22. And 19 submarines from Task Force 7 commanded by Rear Admiral English. Overall, the USN ambushed force was composed of 3 standard carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 13 destroyers and 19 submarines with 1 oil tanker; the ambushed mission was commanded overall by Admiral Nimitz.
Akagi’s air complement composed of 24 A6M2 fighters, 18 D3A1 dive-bombers and 18 B5N2 torpedo-bombers, her overall aircraft was 60. Kaga’s air complement composed of 27 A6M2 fighters, 18 D3A1 dive-bombers and 27 B5N2 torpedo-bombers with 2 D3A1 on reserve, her overall aircraft was 74. Hiryuu’s air complement composed of 21 A6M2 fighters, 18 D3A1 dive-bombers and 18 B5N2 torpedo-bombers, her overall aircraft was 57. Souryuu’s air complement composed of 21 A6M2 fighters, 16 D3A1 dive-bombers and 18 B5N2 torpedo-bombers with 2 D4Y-1C experimental recon aircraft, her overall aircraft was 57. There were also another 5 E13A1, 10 E8N1 and 1 E11A recon floatplanes from the cruisers and battleships.
Yorktown’s air complement composed of 25 F4F-4 fighters, 37 SBD-3 dive-bombers and 15 TBD-1 torpedo-bombers, her overall aircraft was 77. Enterprise’s air complement composed of 27 F4F-4 fighters, 37 SBD-3 dive-bombers and 14 TBD-1 torpedo-bombers, her total aircraft was 78. Hornet’s air complement composed of 27 F4F-4 fighters, 35 SBD-3 dive-bombers and 15 TBD-1 torpedo-bombers, her overall aircraft was 77. There were also another 31 PBY-5 flying boats and 6 TBF-1 from USN, 4 B-26 medium-bombers and 17 B-17 heavy-bombers from USAAF, and 27 SBD-2 dive-bombers, 17 SB2U-3 dive bombers, 21 F2A fighters, 7 F4F-3A fighters and 1 utility aircraft from USMC.
The Battle
[Note: The battle was taken from many different point-of-views, the time that were used had taken from various sources, so it may differ from one source to another.]
The IJN also executed ‘Operation AL’ a day before the invasion; the operation will invade the Aleutian Islands within Northern Pacific which carried out by the 5th Fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Hosogaya, this will also act as a diversion for the Americans so that they could invade Midway by surprise. The Station HYPO, based in Hawaii, began to decipher coded messages from the Japanese and later discover the planned attack on Midway which includes the day; the Americans decided that it will be a perfect chance to ambush the Japanese in their own surprise invasion. On May 27, 1942, the Kido Butai sortied from Hashirajima for Operation MI at 06:00, while Yorktown arrived at Pearl Harbor for immediate repairs. On May 28, 1942, TF-16 sortied from Pearl Harbor while CruDiv 7 departed from Guam to rendezvous with the rest of the Close-Support Force. On May 29, 1942, the Main Force of the 1st Fleet sortied Hashirajima for Operation MI at 06:00, the Midway Invasion Force also sortied Saipan. On May 30, 1942, despite Yorktown’s repair wasn’t fully completed; TF-17 sortied from Pearl Harbor. All submarines sortied out individually to their respective war patrols.
On June 3, 1942 at 03:07, the support group detached from the Kido Butai. At 09:00, a PBY flying boat spotted the Midway Invasion Force some 500 nautical miles west-southwest of Midway. Nine B-17 heavy-bombers sortied from Midway at 12:28, and then at 15:20, the bombers made contact with the occupation force 570 nautical miles, the escort ships repel the bombers. Both parties did not cause any significant damage from each other. At 21:15, 4 PBY flying boats equipped with torpedoes, sortied from Midway.
ON June 4, 1942, at 01:30, the occupation force was attacked by the flying boats from Midway, oil tanker Akebono Maru was damaged from a torpedo during the attack. At 04:00, Vice Admiral Nagumo gives his order to prepare for battles while 6 F4Fs and 11 PBY flying boats sortied from Midway, then 16 B-17 bombers sortied from Midway at 4:05. At 4:30, carriers from both sides began to launch their planes, Yorktown launched 10 SBD-3s, Akagi and Kaga launched 36 A6M2s, 36 D3Y1s and 36 B5N2s leaded by Lt. Tomonaga, Haruna also launched her floatplanes for reconnaissance E8N1 floatplanes. Between 4:35 and 4:38, Chikuma launched 2 E13A1 recon floatplanes and between 04:42 and 05:00, Tone launched 2 E13A1 recon floatplanes. At 5:10, Tone’s floatplanes spotted 2 USN submarines. At 5:20, PBY flying boats spotted the Kido Butai, 1 A6M2 fighter was launched to pursue the flying boat. At 06:00 all aircraft in Midway were launched. At 06:05, Enterprise and Hornet prepare to launch their planes. At 06:15, 21 F2A fighters and 6 F4F from Midway begin to intercept the planes from the Kido Butai, the Japanese lost 4 B5N2s and 3 A6Ms and the Americans lost 3 F4Fs and 13 F2As plus 7 aircraft were damaged during the engagement. At 6:35, the IJN aircraft assaulted Midway Islands. From 108 aircraft that assaulted Midway Islands, 11 were destroyed, 14 were damaged beyond repair and 29 were damaged.
At 07:00, IJN aircraft ended their assault while Hornet began to launch her planes. At 7:06, Enterprise began to launch her planes. At 7:10, 4 B-26 medium-bombers and 6 TBF-1 torpedo-bombers made independent attacks against the Kido Butai, USS Nautilus SS-168 sighted the smokes from the engagement and decided to investigate. Akagi made a full turn and evaded all torpedoes launched against here at 7:12, her CAP managed to shot down 2 B-26s with 1 A6M2 lost in the engagement, 2 B-26s were shot down by Kirishima. At 07:15, Vice Admiral Nagumo still hasn’t made his order for the second attack; he ordered that to rearm B5N2s with HE bombs. At 7:30, Tone’s floatplane spotted an enemy formation of 10 ships but neglects it to provide information regarding about the composition of the enemy formation, until then Vice Admiral Nagumo suspended the B5N2 rearming.
At 07:50, 67 SBD-3s, 29 TBD-1s and 20 F4F-4s were launched from TF-16. At 07:54, Akagi spotted incoming 12 B-17s, she prepare her antiaircraft defense. At 7:55, 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs from USMC in Midway were launched to attack the Kido Butai, Nautilus spotted a Japanese ship formation, Souryuu was under attack by B-17s but sustained no damage. At 8:00, Nautilus closes in and spotted Kirishima, Nagara and 2 destroyers, the submarine was spotted by a CAP fighter; the 2 destroyers began to drop a total of 9 depth charges at the submarine, the aircraft also strafed the submarine, Nautilus manage to escape. At 08:15, 15 B-17s from Midway attacked Kido Butai but didn’t cause any damage. At 08:20, the dive-bombers made contact with the Kido Butai, 2 SBDs and 8 SB2U-3s were lost in the engagement, Maj. Henderson, leading the dive-bomber formation, was killed in action, meanwhile Tone’s floatplane reported the presence of a carrier in the formation. At 8:25, Nautilus spotted Kirishima again; she fired her Mk-14 torpedo but misses, she attempt to fire another but it malfunction. At 08:30, Arashi headed for Nautilus, the submarine dove 46 meter below meanwhile Yorktown began to launch her aircraft, Vice Admiral Nagumo ordered that all bombers be rearmed with torpedoes and AP bombs against the carrier this was opposed by Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, commander of the 2nd CarDiv, Rear Admiral Yamaguchi recommended that they should strike now. At 8:37, IJN aircraft sortied for Midway returns. At 08:40, all attacks from American carriers headed for different direction, that strike was complete uncoordinated. At 08:46, depth charges were dropped again at Nautilus. At 09:00, Nautilus raised her periscope and spotted another carrier, she tried to gain an attacking position but Arashi spotted her again and dropped 9 depth charges at 09:18. At 9:25, 15 dive-bombers from Hornet made contact with the Kido Butai, but they were intercepted by the CAP fighters, all 15 aircraft was lost with only 1 survivor. At 09:30, the 15 torpedo-bombers from Enterprise made contact with the Kido Butai, but they were repelled by the CAP and the carriers’ AA guns. At 9:45, Enterprise’s dive-bombers leaded by Lt Com. McClusky spotted Arashi; the dive-bombers shadowed the destroyer. At 09:55, Nautilus lost track of the IJN force, Arashi decided to withdraw her pursue on the submarine and rejoined the fleet, Nautilus return to the carrier group.
At 10:00, 12 torpedo-bombers from Yorktown made contact with the Kido Butai but was intercepted by the CAP fighters and AA guns. The between 10:15 and 10:20 was the five fateful minutes of the battle, dive-bombers from both Enterprise and Yorktown leaded by Lt Com. Leslie made contact with the Kido Butai independently, the CAP fighters decided to intercept Yorktown’s planes leaving the Kido Butai exposed for Enterprise’s planes, CAP fighters attacked Yorktown’s aircraft which caused Enterprise aircraft to fly undetected. 37 dive-bombers from Enterprise begin to attack Kaga, 13 dive-bombers from Yorktown attack Souryuu, while 3 dive-bombers leaded by Lt. Best detached from the McClulsky’s formation and attack Akagi. At 10:22, Kaga was struck by 4 bombs. At 10:25, Souryuu was struck by 3 bombs. At 10:26, Akagi was struck by 2 bombs and 1 near miss. At 10:33, despite the damage had already taken, Akagi goes maximum turn to avoid 4 torpedo-bombers. At 10:46, Vice Admiral Nagumo transferred to Nagara. At 10:55, Souryuu was declared to be abandon; her survivors boarded Hamakaze and Isokaze. At 11:00 Hiryuu, the only carrier standing from the previous attack, launched 18 D3Y1s escorted by 6 A6M2s leaded by Lt. Tomonaga, the Hiryuu’s aircraft followed Yorktown’s aircraft while Yorktown launched her aircraft for scouting. Akagi stopped at 11:27. At 11:45, Nagara was designated flagship of the Kido Butai.
At 12:00, dive-bombers from Hiryuu attacked Yorktown; Yorktown was struck by 3 bombs, she slightly tilted making her unable to launch or to accept aircraft. At 12:20, Admiral Yamamoto ordered 1st Fleet Main Body, Occupation Force, and 2nd Fleet Second Striking Force to rendezvous. 12:35, Yorktown’s flight deck was repaired, planes from Yorktown landed on Enterprise while Rear Admiral Spruance detached 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers from TF-16 to assist Yorktown. At 12:53, Nautilus spotted the burning Kaga from her periscope. Meanwhile at 13:13, Rear Admiral Fletcher transfer to Astoria. At 13:20, Hiryuu launched 10 B5N2s escorted by 6 A6M2s for a second attack. At 13:50, Yorktown was again operational; she steams at 18 to 20 knots. At 13:59, Nautilus moved into attacking position, she launched four torpedoes at Kaga, two missed, one malfunction and another one was a dud, Nautilus dive below 91 meters to avoid the depth charge counterattacks. At 14:00, Yorktown’s radar detected inbound planes from Hiryuu; her fighters try to intercept the aircraft formation and manage to shot down several torpedo-bombers. At 14:30, Yorktown’s recon planes spotted Hiryuu.
At 14:45, torpedo-bombers from Hiryuu attacked Yorktown for a second time; Yorktown was struck by 2 torpedoes and lost power. At 14:55, Yorktown was declared to be abandon. At 15:30, Enterprise launched 24 SBD-3s including planes from Yorktown. At 16:00, Hiryuu’s planes reported that they’ve downed another aircraft carrier which improved the morale of the Kido Butai. At 16:05, Hornet launched 16 SBD-3s. At 16:30, Kaga was declared to be abandon. At 16:45, the dive-bombers from TF-16 spotted Hiryuu. At 17:01, Chikuma spotted the inbound planes. At 17:03, Hiryuu prepares for another attack when 13 dive-bombers attack her; Hiryuu was struck by 4 bombs at 17:05. At 17:07, Haruna was attacked by Yorktown’s 2 dive-bombers launched from Enterprise but the battleship sustained no damage. At 17:12, dive-bombers from Hornet attacked Tone and Chikuma but the cruisers sustained no damage. At 17:15, Akagi was declared to be abandon, survivors from Kaga boarded Isokaze. At 18:15, 12 B-17s from Oahu attacked Tone and Chikuma; the cruisers again sustained no damage.
At 17:50, survivors from Kaga boarded Maikaze. At 19:13, the orders to scuttle Souryuu and Kaga was given, Isokaze scuttled Souryuu with three torpedoes and sunk at 19:15. At 19:20, TF-16 recovers the last of their planes from the previous strike. At 19:25, Hagikaze scuttled Kaga with two torpedoes and began to sink (source may vary, it was stated that Souryuu deliberately sunk while Kaga was torn apart by two massive explosions and sunk few minutes after). At 20:00, all hands abandoned Akagi. At 20:30, I-168 was ordered to bombard the airfield on Eastern Island. At 23:40, Vice Admiral Nagumo ordered his remaining ships to turn around and cover the Occupation Force for night engagements.
January 5, 1942, at 00:20, Admiral Yamamoto cancels the bombardment mission on Midway Island. At 01:24, I-168 resurfaced within 1,100 yard southwest of Midway Island and open fires her 10-cm deck gun; she fired a total of 6 shells but did not inflict any significant damage. Onshore defensive batteries fire at I-168, the submarine immediately submerged to avoid damage and was chased away by patrol boats. At 01:58, an explosion occurs on Hiryuu. At 02:15, USS Tambor SS-198, while conducting her war patrol, spotted four Japanese ships 90 nautical miles north of Midway Islands. At 02:38, Hiryuu was declared to be abandoned. At 02:55, Admiral Yamamoto cancels Operation MI, the force changed course, and at the same time Kumano spotted Tambor, the cruiser maneuvers 45 degrees starboard to avoid the submarine. Kumano and Suzuya properly executed ship maneuvers, but Mikuma makes a 90 degrees turn while Mogami, which behind Mikuma, made 45 degrees turn, this resulted to a collision between the two cruisers at 03:00, Mogami’s bow was carve and was badly damaged while Mikuma’s oil tank was raptured. Suzuya and Kumano detached from the group and proceed northwest while Mogami and Mikuma escorted by Asashio and Arashio proceed westward.
At 03:15, survivors from Hiryuu boarded Makigumo and Kazagumo. At 03:50, Admiral Yamamoto ordered Akagi to be scuttled; Vice Admiral Nagumo received the order. At 04:12, Tambor identified the ships, she reported it to Midway though she did not attack and withdrawn from her position. At 04:30, 12 B-17s sortied from Midway, Hiryuu’s evacuation was complete but Rear Admiral Yamaguchi stayed. At 5:10, Akagi was scuttled by Arashi, Hagikaze, Maikaze and Nowaki, each fire one torpedo, Makigumo scuttled Hiryuu. At 05:20, Akagi sunk. At 05:34, B-17s attacked Mogami’s group, the bombers didn’t caused any damage. At 06:30, a plane from Houshou spotted Hiryuu still afloat, Tanikaze was dispatched to scuttle the carrier. At 06:52, Chikuma’s E8N2 floatplane spotted the crippled Yorktown. At 07:00, 6 SBDs and 6 SB2Us sortied from Midway. At 08:05, dive-bombers from Midway attacked Mogami’s group, the dive-bombers scored several near-misses. At 09:12, Hiryuu sunk before Tanikaze arrive. At 10:55, I-168 received the order to pursue the Yorktown. At 11:00, USS Monaghan DD-354 detached from TF-16 to scout the IJN Main Body and to rescue any survivors. At 12:05, Chikuma sighted the Main Body and Occupation Force, the Japanese Forces rendezvous and retreated to Japan. At 12:59, Zuihou’s group was detached and was assigned to the Northern Force. At 14:30, minesweeper USS Vireo AM-52 began to tow Yorktown. At 15:00, Enterprise launched 32 dive-bombers. At 15:10, Hornet launched 26 dive-bombers. At 15:45, dive-bombers from TF-16 made contact with a Japanese ship, it was Tanikaze, the destroyer was attacked but no damage was made. At 18:30, Monaghan joined other destroyers and guarded Yorktown. At 20:00, Yorktown and Hornet recover their dive-bombers. At night, the IJN destroyers transferred the survivors from the carriers to the battleships.
June 6, 1942, at 04:10, I-168 spotted Yorktown from 12 nautical miles away, the submarines closes in. At 05:02 Enterprise launched 18 SBD-3s to scout the area 200 nautical miles. At 06:00, I-168 spotted a group of destroyers guarding Yorktown. At 06:05, USS Hammann DD-412 puts a salvage party on the carrier. At 06:30, Mikuma spotted two US aircraft. 07:59, Hornet launched 26 SBD-3s escorted by 8 F4F-4s. At 9:45, aircraft from Hornet made contact with Mogami’s group, Mogami, Mikuma and Asashio received minor damages from the attack. At 10:45, Enterprise launched 31 SBD-3s escorted by 12 F4F-4s; also 26 B-17s sortied from Midway, the bombers spotted USS Grayling SS-209, the submarine was mistaken as a cruiser so she was attacked, Grayling immediately crash dive to avoid damage. At 11:50, aircraft from Enterprise made contact with Mogami’s group, Mogami and Mikuma were bombed. At 13:31, I-168 managed to move undetected near Yorktown and gain an attacking position, the submarine fired 2 torpedoes from 1,900 yards, another 2 torpedoes 3 seconds later. The first torpedo hit Hammann which break her in half and sunk. At 13:32, 2 torpedoes hit Yorktown, while the other one miss. At 13:36, the destroyers dropped their depth charges at I-168 and damaged her. At 14:45, a second group from Hornet arrived and bombed Mikuma. From the TF-16 attacks, Mogami was struck by 6 bombs, Asashio and Arashio were struck by 1 bomb each and Mikuma was struck by 5 bombs, the bomb caused fire on Mikuma’s deck which stops her on water and sunk afterwards. Mikuma’s survivors were rescued by Mogami, Asashio and Arashio. At 16:40, I-168 still continue to fight for survival, she tried to get away from USS Gwin DD-433, USS Hughes DD-410 and Monaghan, the destroyers fires at I-168 from 6500 yards for about 30 minutes. I-168 immediately submerged at 18:50 and avoided all depth charge. At 19:00, TF-16 completed its air operation and now proceeds eastward to rendezvous with the oil tankers. At 20:00 I-168 resurfaced. On June 7, 1942, Yorktown sunk at 04:58; the battle came to its conclusion.
The Result/Aftermath
The Battle of Midway resulted a tremendous lost for the IJN, losing 4 carriers and 1 heavy cruiser, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers and 1 submarine were damaged with 248 aircraft destroyed and 3,057 casualties. Meanwhile during Operation AL made initial successful results; they've occupied Kiska Island on June 6, 1942, and occupied Attu Island on the next day that meet little resistance, but despite of this success, IJN lost something important that will take 3 years for them to recover. On June 9, 1942, Admiral Yamamoto held a conference on Yamato to discuss about the factors that caused their defeat together with representatives from the Kido Butai, Admiral Yamamoto agreed that he will take full responsibility on this defeat and promised Vice Admiral Nagumo another chance. The IJN had kept the fact of their crushing defeat at Midway hidden from public so that it won’t decrease the morale of their troops which they have gained from the initial battles they had fought, thus on June 11, 1942, Japan claims victory from the battle. Also 2 American airmen from Enterprise were picked by destroyer Makigumo and another from Yorktown was picked by Arashi on June 4, 1942, the prisoners were interrogated by the Japanese and then they were tied on drums and tossed on water to drown on June 15, 1942 (source may vary). The IJN also undergoes to a major reorganization on July 14, 1942, because of their lost in Midway.
The USN lost 1 carrier and 1 destroyer from the engagement with about 150 aircraft destroyed and 307 casualties. But despite of these losses, the USN scored their first decisive victory against the Japanese in the Pacific, the result also boosted the morale of the American troops. TF-16 arrived at Pearl Harbor on June 13, 1942. On June 18, 1942, USS Ballard DD-267 rescued 35 survivors marooned on Hiryuu. Though the Battle of Midway may consider as the ‘Turning Point of the Pacific’, the first American major offensive operation against the Japanese began on August 7, 1942, which was codenamed Operation Watchtower. The American troops still continue to face battle hardened Japanese in many battles in the Pacific.
The Battle of Midway was the second naval engagement which carrier engaged each other. The battle involved 4 carriers from the IJN and 3 carriers from the USN, but there are also several carriers from both sides that did not participate or perhaps arrived late in the battle. From the IJN, Shoukaku was still on repairs because of the damage she received in the Battle of the Coral Sea while Zuikaku’s air complement wasn’t yet replenished, Ryuujou and Jun’you were assigned to the Northern Force to assault the Dutch Harbor during Operation AL, Zuihou and Houshou did not directly engaged the enemies in Midway, Hiyou was still on trial during the battle and Ryuuhou was still being converted. From the USN, USS Saratoga CV-3 departed from San Diego on June 1, 1942, the battle was over when Saratoga arrived, USS Wasp CV-7 and USS Ranger CV-4 were assigned within Atlantic Ocean, Wasp was reassigned to the Pacific after the battle and USS Essex CV-9 was still under construction.
essentially, amerika rolled several natural 20s in a row. the goddess of luck was given a huge bribe and thus allowed US aircrafts to appear at the perfect places at the perfect time to deal maximum damage which drastically turned the tables in favor of the stars and stripes.
god i love this picture. i'm such a sick bastard.
To get it out of the way, it should be stated that Hiryuu, here, should be perfectly unscathed, rather than bleeding and smoking. She survived the initial wave solely by the fact that she was on the far side of the formation, so the three bomber squadrons simply hit the three other carriers. *NONE* of the Japanese carriers showed they could survive even a single bomb. (Besides the more modern Shoukaku that wasn't at Midway, and was denigrated and left with the inferior pilots specifically because she was newer and wouldn't have killed the elite pilots so spectacularly.)
But anyway, even if America's luck were less fortunate, the American forces could have still probably pulled out a victory. (And tell the near-total losses of the torpedo bomber squadrons how lucky they were...)
There were two overwhelming advantages on the American's side:
First, while the Japanese high command knew that the Americans were out there, the actual admiral on the carrier had no clue where the American carriers were until he had some of his bombers follow the returning dive bombers to their carrier. (That, basically, necessitated that the Japanese let at least one of their carriers be hit by American bombs before they could have responded. If American bombers had stayed completely lost, that would have just let America get a second swing at a preemptive strike.
Second, American carriers could take a punch, and Japanese carriers couldn't. Akagi was destroyed with a single hit and a NEAR MISS. The MISS was capable of destroying her rear damage control systems. That is to say, the one thing that should be the most robust, most redundancy-laden piece of equipment on a ship was not only the first to go, but literally destroyed by an attack that didn't even hit! The Japanese had unarmored fuel lines running all throughout the ship, along with literally just leaving bombs lying about in the open in the hangar. The wooden-decked carriers would offer no real resistance to 500-pound or 1000-pound bombs falling through the planks, so every bomb that hit the deck would pierce the deck and trigger a chain reaction of the carrier's own aircraft bombs, guaranteeing that at least one of them would detonate the unarmored aviation fuel stores, triggering an explosion from which none of the carriers could survive. One ship dying of a chain reaction of explosions is a fluke. EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THOSE CARRIERS dying because of a SINGLE bomb strike is a crippling design flaw.
This isn't even limited to carriers - the famous Japanese Zeros got their high performance from a relatively underpowered engine almost purely through the fact that they stripped out every single scrap of armor or safety feature they possibly could to save weight. The result was fast and maneuverable, but a deathtrap that could spontaneously combust. While American pilots could live to learn from their mistakes and grow into aces over time, Japanese pilots were a small handful of elites that bled out of attrition that could never be replaced by anyone but the rookies that died in the "Turkey Shoot". The absolutely criminal Japanese disregard for defense or operator safety led directly to their crippling losses in a war of attrition they were never prepared to fight.
(It's little wonder that they keep uttering a motto like "Those who take the initiative win" - that's only the case if people can die in the first strike. That's not how the Americans, or especially the British fought. The British motto was basically "the one whose armor is thick enough to withstand everything the other side throws at you can't lose.")
Meanwhile, Yorktown had just been badly damaged in Coral Sea, had a slapdash repair rated only to be good enough to keep her together for just a couple weeks to get her through this one fight, and took the first bombing from the Japanese, taking serious hits that damaged her flight deck enough that she couldn't fly planes and shut her boilers offline. But not only did she not explode, her damage control systems and utterly superhuman damage control teams were capable of patching her together so well that an hour later, she was running again and patched up so that the next wave of Japanese couldn't tell that she was the damaged carrier at all, and assumed it was a new carrier. (They even reported that they had sunk a US carrier at the last bombing!) The second one actually managed to get some torpedoes in, so it dealt real damage. (Oh, and the Japanese had actually counted themselves as having sunk Yorktown twice, thinking they were facing off a one-on-one carrier battle after they bombed Yorktown the second time.)
Even that didn't sink her. (Although she was severely damaged in the second strike, and listing.) Yorktown was only finally sunk by I-168 firing a large spread of torpedoes at her while she was already damaged. (Basically being the reason why Imuya is even in the game...) (The Japanese initially reported they sank all American carriers because they had three sinking reports, while hiding their own carrier losses.)
The Japanese reported that they had sunk all three American carriers because they couldn't believe that American carriers weren't as flimsy a piece of plywood soaked in gasoline as their carriers were.
And this is to say nothing of how much more durable the British carriers, who pioneered armored carriers, were. (The Japanese and American armored carriers were just copying British ideas.) The British carriers, when bombed, could be back to ready to launch after being bombed with as little as a "Sweepers, man your brooms" to get the bomb debris out of the launch path.
In truth, the Americans had numerous fumbles that day, but they were ultimately facing an enemy that had 0 armor and 1 HP, while their long string of bad luck was interrupted by good design and better forethought. In fact, it was only a minor miracle on the Japanese side of the positioning of enough debris in the water in just the right spot that gave Imuya the cover she needed to give Japan the only solace in its victory. Otherwise, Yorktown could very well have limped home, and made it a 4-0 wipeout, carrier-wise. Japanese subs were notriously more noisy and easily detected than American subs, and Americans had much better sonar, resulting in the totally lopsided amount of losses to subs on either side. (Just go down the list of KanColle destroyers, and look at how many of them were lost to subs.) This was in spite of the fact that American subs had weaker and notoriously unreliable torpedoes throughout most of the war.
To get it out of the way, it should be stated that Hiryuu, here, should be perfectly unscathed, rather than bleeding and smoking. She survived the initial wave solely by the fact that she was on the far side of the formation, so the three bomber squadrons simply hit the three other carriers. *NONE* of the Japanese carriers showed they could survive even a single bomb. (Besides the more modern Shoukaku that wasn't at Midway, and was denigrated and left with the inferior pilots specifically because she was newer and wouldn't have killed the elite pilots so spectacularly.)
But anyway, even if America's luck were less fortunate, the American forces could have still probably pulled out a victory. (And tell the near-total losses of the torpedo bomber squadrons how lucky they were...)
There were two overwhelming advantages on the American's side:
First, while the Japanese high command knew that the Americans were out there, the actual admiral on the carrier had no clue where the American carriers were until he had some of his bombers follow the returning dive bombers to their carrier. (That, basically, necessitated that the Japanese let at least one of their carriers be hit by American bombs before they could have responded. If American bombers had stayed completely lost, that would have just let America get a second swing at a preemptive strike.
Second, American carriers could take a punch, and Japanese carriers couldn't. Akagi was destroyed with a single hit and a NEAR MISS. The MISS was capable of destroying her rear damage control systems. That is to say, the one thing that should be the most robust, most redundancy-laden piece of equipment on a ship was not only the first to go, but literally destroyed by an attack that didn't even hit! The Japanese had unarmored fuel lines running all throughout the ship, along with literally just leaving bombs lying about in the open in the hangar. The wooden-decked carriers would offer no real resistance to 500-pound or 1000-pound bombs falling through the planks, so every bomb that hit the deck would pierce the deck and trigger a chain reaction of the carrier's own aircraft bombs, guaranteeing that at least one of them would detonate the unarmored aviation fuel stores, triggering an explosion from which none of the carriers could survive. One ship dying of a chain reaction of explosions is a fluke. EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THOSE CARRIERS dying because of a SINGLE bomb strike is a crippling design flaw.
This isn't even limited to carriers - the famous Japanese Zeros got their high performance from a relatively underpowered engine almost purely through the fact that they stripped out every single scrap of armor or safety feature they possibly could to save weight. The result was fast and maneuverable, but a deathtrap that could spontaneously combust. While American pilots could live to learn from their mistakes and grow into aces over time, Japanese pilots were a small handful of elites that bled out of attrition that could never be replaced by anyone but the rookies that died in the "Turkey Shoot". The absolutely criminal Japanese disregard for defense or operator safety led directly to their crippling losses in a war of attrition they were never prepared to fight.
(It's little wonder that they keep uttering a motto like "Those who take the initiative win" - that's only the case if people can die in the first strike. That's not how the Americans, or especially the British fought. The British motto was basically "the one whose armor is thick enough to withstand everything the other side throws at you can't lose.")
Meanwhile, Yorktown had just been badly damaged in Coral Sea, had a slapdash repair rated only to be good enough to keep her together for just a couple weeks to get her through this one fight, and took the first bombing from the Japanese, taking serious hits that damaged her flight deck enough that she couldn't fly planes and shut her boilers offline. But not only did she not explode, her damage control systems and utterly superhuman damage control teams were capable of patching her together so well that an hour later, she was running again and patched up so that the next wave of Japanese couldn't tell that she was the damaged carrier at all, and assumed it was a new carrier. (They even reported that they had sunk a US carrier at the last bombing!)
Even that didn't sink her. Yorktown was only finally sunk by I-19 firing a large spread of torpedoes at her while she was already damaged. (Basically being the reason why Iku is even in the game...)
The Japanese reported that they had sunk all three American carriers because they couldn't believe that American carriers weren't as flimsy a piece of plywood soaked in gasoline as their carriers were.
And this is to say nothing of how much more durable the British carriers, who pioneered armored carriers, were. (The Japanese and American armored carriers were just copying British ideas.) The British carriers, when bombed, could be back to ready to launch after being bombed with as little as a "Sweepers, man your brooms" to get the bomb debris out of the launch path.
In truth, the Americans had numerous fumbles that day, but they were ultimately facing an enemy that had 0 armor and 1 HP, while their long string of bad luck was interrupted by good design and better forethought. In fact, it was only a minor miracle on the Japanese side of the positioning of enough debris in the water in just the right spot that gave Iku the cover she needed to give Japan the only solace in its victory. Otherwise, Yorktown could very well have limped home, and made it a 4-0 wipeout, carrier-wise. Japanese subs were notriously more noisy and easily detected than American subs, and Americans had much better sonar, resulting in the totally lopsided amount of losses to subs on either side. (Just go down the list of KanColle destroyers, and look at how many of them were lost to subs.) This was in spite of the fact that American subs had weaker and notoriously unreliable torpedoes throughout most of the war.
I thought it was Imuya, Iku was famous for something else, if I recall.
Actually, while the resistance of the British carriers seemed impressive, in reality the damage they took was severe. Having the hangar inside the hull girder made the hull structure weak and the ships were deformed by comparatively minor damage.
This design flaw gave a premature end to the HMS Formidable and HMS Illustrious (both ships were surveyed in 1947 to assess the expenditure required to repair them and it was found that both were beyond economical repair. In effect, they needed their hulls completely reconstructed and plans to rebuild them were abandoned). The gasoline explosion on the HMS Indomitable had the same effect; again hull damage was beyond economical repair.
While the Japanese put emphasis on quality over quantity, the British took the other way around, which explains why their armoured carriers had a short service life in comparison to the American Essex-class carriers.
Actually, while the resistance of the British carriers seemed impressive, in reality the damage they took was severe. Having the hangar inside the hull girder made the hull structure weak and the ships were deformed by comparatively minor damage.
This design flaw gave a premature end to the HMS Formidable and HMS Illustrious (both ships were surveyed in 1947 to assess the expenditure required to repair them and it was found that both were beyond economical repair. In effect, they needed their hulls completely reconstructed and plans to rebuild them were abandoned). The gasoline explosion on the HMS Indomitable had the same effect; again hull damage was beyond economical repair.
While the Japanese put emphasis on quality over quantity, the British took the other way around, which explains why their armoured carriers had a short service life in comparison to the American Essex-class carriers.
I'm speaking more in terms of what matters in a single fight.
In KanColle terms, the British would have much better armor, and that armored carrier capacity to launch at medium damage, but monstrously longer repair times in addition to smaller hangars and resource consumption. Japanese carriers would have, comparatively, large numbers of aircraft, but jack all HP or armor, and be incapable of launching at even light damage. (Exception given to Shoukaku and Zuikaku, and hypothetically, also Taihou, had she not suffered from many of the same old design flaws.) American carriers are more robust (HP), but not more armored, but have the largest aircraft capacity.
Not entirely unlike KTKM-sama or Ooi, the Japanese carriers were entirely built upon a strategy of killing the other guy before they had a chance to respond. It was very much luck-based on the whole.
Because I had a similar discussion in another corner of the Internet, as well, however, I looked up what it actually cost to build some of these carriers, as part of an argument about how "the best carrier" should be measured in terms of opportunity cost. Hence, it was judging carriers based upon price, so that you would be judging, say, 11 Casablanca-class CVEs to 1 Essex-class CV, because it turns out Casablanca-class carriers cost about $6 million apiece, while the Essex-class cost roughly $70 million. (Originally $40 million, but with redesigns constantly coming throughout the war, the price went up.) The HMS Ark Royal, meanwhile, cost roughly 3 million pounds (and was the most expensive the English had built), which, at that era's exchange rates, was roughly $15 million, or just over a fifth of what an Essex cost. (Granted, I don't have the most reliable sources just randomly Googling until I find something, so someone may well come on with a different number.) An Essex facing 4-to-1 odds against it from an Ark Royal or even the 11-to-1 odds against it from a Casablanca would very likely lose. (A Casablanca can't launch the largest planes, though, and only carries 28 aircraft to a Essex's 90-110.)
It could therefore be argued that building disposable armored carriers, even allowing hull warp that was more economical to build a new carrier than repair, was actually more cost-effective than risking losing one entirely in battle, and certainly more likely to win you the battle overall.
if that's not boning luck herself, I don't know what is.
Well, I guess you don't know what luck is, then, because you're describing a lot of deliberate efforts of a great number of people as something that just fell from the sky.
In order...
"Zeroth Luck"
Allied codebreakers on both fronts routinely broke the codes of the Axis. Maybe breaking the Enigma code is more famous, but the Japanese codes were broken with clockwork regularity. The reason they signed the Washington Naval Treaty with poor terms was because the Americans had cracked their code then. The Japanese changed them again just before Pearl Harbor in a stroke of really bad luck, because American diplomatic personnel tipped their hand as to once again cracking their codes.
Codebreaking is not luck. It's the payoff of a deliberate effort to actually perform codebreaking, and paying a good number of cryptologists to work on the problem. (Is it luck when repeated experimentation results in scientific advancement?) America built some of the first computers in the world just to crack codes. There's plenty of random online places to look this stuff up.
"First Luck"
Since when is the design philosophy of anyone "luck"? Was it "luck" that the Tiger tanks had heavy armor, but often broke their transmissions because their great weight put too much stress upon them? Was it "luck" that the British chose their carriers be armored for the specific reason that, knowing they would operate within range of land-based bombers while in the Mediterranean, they knew they would be far more likely to be subjected to bombing than the open-seas carriers of the Americans and Japanese? Was it "luck" that Japanese Zero fighters were specifically stripped down to no armor or safety equipment specifically to meet the overly-optimistic demands of the IJN? For that matter, was it just bad luck when the USS Wasp blew up from a torpedo when its designers had purposefully stripped out armor just to make the wasp fit into the remaining 15,000 tons they had left over to make a new carrier? Decisions have consequences, pretending this sort of thing is luck is absurd.
"Second Luck"
This is basically same as the last one - the Japanese never put thought into preventing explosions, and this was a direct result. In fact, in a review after Midway, they actually changed all their rearming/refueling practices as a direct result of this failure. This was just one of those safety lessons that they weren't going to learn until after something blew up in their face, which is not at all uncommon for any nation. (The Americans learned their safety from the British, who were in obvious closer contact with America at the time, and who were quite fastidious, for good reason, about damage control.) If you could call anything good fortune, it's just that nothing like this had happened to the Japanese yet to force them to rethink their procedures, but obviously, they weren't going to get that lesson from the too-easy wars with China and Russia, and their carrier program was still fairly new. The Japanese kept their carriers out of harms way against the colonial powers before Pearl Harbor. Only Coral Sea ever really gave them a chance to fail spectacularly, but the better-built Shoukaku was the only one who took damage there. (The idea that the Shoukaku that could actually take a punch was "misfortunate" compared to the carriers that instantly caught fire and torched 3/4ths of their crew is a bizarre attribution of the Japanese. The Americans called Enterprise "Lucky E" for surviving a freakish amount of damage.) So I guess you could say the best luck here was that it was "lucky" that the Americans suffered a tactical defeat a few months earlier, rather than being "unlucky" and triggering an explosion that destroyed a Japanese carrier then...
Even without the loose bombs, however, Japanese damage control systems, especially on the converted carriers, which were never that well designed to begin with, were notoriously poor. (Again, a MISS destroyed Akagi's damage control systems.) In fact, it's probable that Akagi's bombs weren't actually set off in a chain reaction, which is why she burned for 10 hours before going down, unlike Kaga going down in 6 minutes. The problem was that as soon as any damage was incurred, all damage control systems on Akagi were offline (even the backup fire extinguishing system), and the Japanese never fixed these flaws. (See the Taihou sinking from a single torpedo that didn't even detonate properly, and which the admiral onboard didn't consider an important threat - Japanese damage control systems again failed by venting dangerous gasoline fumes INTO the carrier instead of OUT of the carrier, setting off a crippling explosion.) It's not "luck" when every single Pinto is capable of exploding from as little as a hammer whack, it's bad design.
"Third Luck"
This wasn't so much luck as it was the deliberate battle plan of Admiral Fletcher. He calculated that, instead of sending massed waves, sending a string of aircraft as they came off the decks would increase American casualties (they did), but at the same time, harry Japanese defenders until they made a mistake (which they did).
By that measure, I guess it was really "lucky" that Japanese torpedo bombers had devised torpedoes and techniques to torpedo American ships at harbor in shallow water before going into Pearl Harbor, right?
"Fourth Luck"
Here we have some actual luck taking place. However, it's not nearly as decisive as you portray it to be. Keep in mind, that was actually the third or fourth wave of bombers to strike at the Japanese carriers, and the Japanese had yet to realize where the American carriers were until after the Americans had a successful bombing. If no bombers successfully found the Japanese, they would have had another shot at a surprise bombing, as the Japanese admiral actually in command was pretty oblivious to what sort of threat they were facing. (Yamamoto had received warning about the carriers and increased sub activity, but didn't relay it to Nagumo, the admiral carrying out the operation, thinking he had already been told separately, and not wanting to give away his position via radio broadcast because, hey, those Americans are constantly monitoring our radio transmissions.)
Besides that, it was only one squadron that happened to find the Japanese carriers "by good fortune", which was not really all that fortunate to begin with... Keep in mind, it was BAD fortune that caused them to get lost in the first place, and they had lost several bombers to fuel exhaustion by that point.
Then, there's the argument that the timing was really fortuitous, which may have some weight, but I'd also argue that the Hiryuu sank from dive bombers that didn't have any such good fortune, and managed to strike their targets even with 12 Zeros flying CAP looking for them, losing only 2 planes.
It was more bad luck and miscommunication, (see, these things happen on both sides all the time during this war, you're glossing over the "bad luck" to only focus on the "good luck" of the American side,) that almost had American bombers attack the same carrier (Kaga) instead of attacking different carriers. (Akagi was only attacked by 3 planes because of miscommunication, and the other bombers from the squadron going after Kaga. Still, only one bomb hit, helped by a near miss, killed Akagi because of her crippling design flaws.)
Even if the Americans had destroyed only 2 carriers instead of 3 in that first strike, they still would have very likely been capable of winning - all counterattacks went to the Yorktown, which was generally not operating during the time she was under constant attack, while Enterprise and Hornet were doing the killing from further away. Yorktown didn't sink until Imuya's sub attack after the battle was over, so having more planes in the air bombing Yorktown more thoroughly may well have made no difference, ultimately, but for a few extra American casualties. The American flights that sank Hiryuu also had extra bombers with left-over bombs that refrained from ultimately bombing Hiryuu more, since they could see she was already sinking, and attacked other Japanese ships in the area. Had another Japanese carrier survived to that point, those planes could have easily struck that carrier, as well.
Even without that one stroke of good luck in the midst of a lot of strokes of bad luck, the Americans could have still pulled through with fairly similar results.
Final Note
If you want to paint this in D&D terms, this was like a party of 4 level 1 characters getting killed by a party of 3 level 5 characters, and claiming that it was all because of luck, just because some of the rolls on that side were fairly decent, even while ignoring those three 1s in a row before they got that 20.
The reason the Americans won was because of things that go much deeper than luck alone, and they would have won even with more things going against them than actually did. As is generally noted in most reviews of the battle I've read, American mistakes were often covered for by American strengths and ship design, while Japanese mistakes were allowed to become unmitigated fiascoes.
Quite simply, the Japanese fleet was always built as a glass cannon - they could be devastatingly effective when they had the initiative in hit-and-run tactics that limited their exposure, but as soon as they were forced to fight a slugging match, they crumpled like paper. This being an overall result of the Kaiten Kessen strategy in general, but even that is probably casting a little too much blame on something that they probably had to adopt, anyway. The real culprit is simply Japan's lack of resources or capacity to match American - or English - industry. They never could have stood up to America or England toe-to-toe, but tried to find some way to match American and English navies, regardless, and continually did so in ways that took massive risks with no fallback plan. (Including the "strip out the safeties in our planes, who needs armor if you're maneuverable?" strategy of the Zeros.)
The people who were taking the massive gamble, (and therefore, needed massive luck to succeed,) were the Japanese. They relied too much upon risky plans and both initiative and surprise to try to claim a quick victory, with no capacity to endure the sort of war of attrition America was capable of fighting.
as far as the real world is concerned, a lot of things happen by chance. mis-communications, hearsay, lies and deception often plagued the wars of the past. often critical decisions are made by one single guy who said 'meh' or 'k that sounds like a good idea'. Now I believe this chance thing is part of luck and what transpired at mid-way is what counts as 'lucky'. whether you do is your choice. Sure, a lot of great minds were at work, but it was by chance that they were competent and it was by chance that their enemy's team wasn't as competent.
an example of this would be me saying "oh, well the fact that the enterprise was never hit by a torpedo was pretty lucky" and your rebuttal would be "that's because USN had better equipment to deal with torpedoes." who is correct? I would like to point out that I am 50% joking these days, so don't take my words too seriously.
Also, regarding stats; come on man, i wouldn't put the IJN battle group at lvl 1, what about the exp they gained from pearl harbor (although the states was really 'lucky' that nothing 'really important' was bombed). If anything I would say that the IJN carriers were lvl 2, while the USN carriers are actually lvl 1s, but from a different variant of DnD and has much higher stats despite the fact that they were lvl 1s.
Edit: those oxygen torpedoes blowing up their own ships though-----
"Luck" is generally used to describe things that are simply beyond the control of the people involved, but if you're talking about the aggregate efforts of a whole nation, there was generally at least a chance to tip the odds towards one thing or another happening.
Every military has miscommunications, but the more effort upon discipline regarding communications a nation spends, the more they can mitigate its ill effects.
Looking at it from a vacuum, devoid of context, it's easy to just say it was good fortune (or ill fortune, from the IJN perspective) that a single bomb could destroy a carrier, but that's like saying that it's bad luck that someone's house was destroyed by a volcano eruption when they built their house on what they knew was an active volcano. Some bad luck can be avoided.
So far as Enterprise evading torpedoes, there was some luck there for that specific ship, considering as other American carriers were torpedoed, but there was a significant set of advantages Americans had against Japanese subs. American sonar (past the earliest parts of the war) was superior to Japanese sonar, while American subs were much quieter. (Due to Americans refrigerating their equipment to keep it from overheating - Japanese ships would boil the water near their hulls, creating turbulence that was easy for sonar to pick up.) This let American subs be far more aggressive, especially since Americans could generally establish a much larger range of air superiority and refuel subs further out than the Japanese could. American subs devastated especially the destroyers (just look at how many of those destroyers went down to subs - nearly a third of all destroyers the Japanese had).
So far as torpedoes themselves went, however, the Japanese "Oxygen" torpedoes (called Long Lance by the Allies) were actually probably the best torpedoes in the world at that time. The American torpedoes at that time were horrifically unreliable, and weaker than the Japanese torpedoes even when they did work. (And the US side actually rolled a string of bolos on their torpedo rolls - of the torpedoes that actually got into the water targeting the Japanese carriers, NONE actually detonated. They were unreliable, but should still have worked more than 0% of the time. It's kind of hard to have a successful torpedo bombing run when your torpedoes don't work, even if you survive the Zeros shooting you down on the way there.)
When talking about stats and D&D, I said the Japanese were like Lv 1 characters just because that's around the level where you can seriously get killed in a single shot. I'm more talking about HP totals than EXP levels. At the time, the Japanese had elite pilots on those carriers against "mere" regulars and veterans. (Infamously, though, Japanese pilot quality would drop precipitously following the defeat, as they had little capacity to train replacements the way the US did.) If you want to go that route with an RPG metaphor, though, the Japanese min-maxed their carriers very poorly, making themselves have huge DEX and STR, (or INT if we're pretending carriers are wizards) but made CON their dump stat, had crap HP, and didn't bother putting any points into Spot or Listen, because they were expecting Tone and other submarine recon elements to do it for them. (Tone's catapult malfunctioned, and Japanese submarine recon was scared off by American subs in the region specifically in response to the Japanese using the exact same rendezvous point before Pearl Harbor, leading America to guard it.)
When talking about stats and D&D, I said the Japanese were like Lv 1 characters just because that's around the level where you can seriously get killed in a single shot. I'm more talking about HP totals than EXP levels. At the time, the Japanese had elite pilots on those carriers against "mere" regulars and veterans. (Infamously, though, Japanese pilot quality would drop precipitously following the defeat, as they had little capacity to train replacements the way the US did.)
The skill of pre-war Japanese pilots verses US Navy and Marine pilots has always been overblown in my view. The "elite" Japanese fliers never traded better then 1 to 1 verses the US Navy during the war, at any point (in fact they did considerably worse by and large). Even more damning was that said fliers never managed win a single stratgetic victory in carrier battles and they lost more pilots then the US in virtually all of them. For me anyway if you want to be 'the best' one simple factor overrides all others: you need to win. You don't get to lose every battle and take heavier losses and then claim to be the best in the world.
The proof is in the pudding as the saying goes.
It's often talked about how badly Japanese pilot quality declined after late 1942 and yet it just as often seems to be glossed over that causing that decline necessitated butchering that elite cadre to start with. A task largely accomplished by US Navy and Marine pilots flying into at best even fights and often outnumbered engagements during 1942. It would seem to follow that a force that confronts a peer enemy on the field of battle and bests it consistently can only be considered the superior fighting unit, and yet there seems this drive to try and portray the Japanese aviators and carrier force at the war's start as world beating superman... who still somehow managed to lose and be slaughtered. It's a rather schizophrenic narrative.
tl;dr At Midway, America called Japan's bluff and got to work from this point forward.
My apologies... Please... scuttle me with the torpedoes.
Her sinking line.The fire on the flight deck, it won't dim... Sorry...
Her sinking line.I'll strike on, even if I'm the last one standing!
Her battle line.Akagi-san, If you're safe then it's fine... I'm going first... I will be waiting.
Her sinking line.