Fletcher was supposed to support the marines landing on Guadalcanal. But then the Japanese surprised the fleet and destroyed many ships in a night battle.
As a result, he ordered the carriers who were supposed to support the landing out of the area. (The US at this point of the war only had a handful of carriers and if they got destroyed, then its game over).
Need to say, the marines were pissed being left high and dry.
Fletcher was supposed to support the marines landing on Guadalcanal. But then the Japanese surprised the fleet and destroyed many ships in a night battle.
As a result, he ordered the carriers who were supposed to support the landing out of the area. (The US at this point of the war only had a handful of carriers and if they got destroyed, then its game over).
Need to say, the marines were pissed being left high and dry.
Well, personally I would agree with Fletcher, save the carriers first and wait until the threat of the Japanese Navy is gone
Guadalcanal perhaps was the closest the Japanese ever got from achieving their initial objectives: at the very least it would substantially delay the American advance, which would accomplish more than the Pearl Harbor raid did.
However, given the inflexible nature of the "Kantai Kessen" doctrine (the American fleets were expected to run into an ambush, but since the Americans had to defend or leave Guadalcanal it was impossible to expect them doing that), the lack of cooperation between sections of the navy and army as well, made a large scale counter-offensive nearly impossible.
Concentration of mass against a prepared enemy was practically an alien concept for the Japanese officers. Even IJN Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, who witnessed the remarkable successes of the Combined Fleet air force was not convinced of the supremacy of naval air power. Two months before Midway, he wrote on his war diary: “…air power over a huge expanse of water is difficult. Are carriers enough to advance air power? All general opinion is like this. If we had a sure way to neutralize enemy battleships, there would be no need to spend billions in yen and materials to build our own.”
The Americans were well aware that concentration of mass and carriers ability of projecting airpower on a given point at an opportune time were important factors to win the war, and when the Japanese finally realized the nature of the war it was too late: they virtually lost all their reserves of ships, merchantmen, planes and pilots.
Guadalcanal perhaps was the closest the Japanese ever got from achieving their initial objectives: at the very least it would substantially delay the American advance, which would accomplish more than the Pearl Harbor raid did.
However, given the inflexible nature of the "Kantai Kessen" doctrine (the American fleets were expected to run into an ambush, but since the Americans had to defend or leave Guadalcanal it was impossible to expect them doing that), the lack of cooperation between sections of the navy and army as well, made a large scale counter-offensive nearly impossible.
Concentration of mass against a prepared enemy was practically an alien concept for the Japanese officers. Even IJN Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, who witnessed the remarkable successes of the Combined Fleet air force was not convinced of the supremacy of naval air power. Two months before Midway, he wrote on his war diary: “…air power over a huge expanse of water is difficult. Are carriers enough to advance air power? All general opinion is like this. If we had a sure way to neutralize enemy battleships, there would be no need to spend billions in yen and materials to build our own.”
The Americans were well aware that concentration of mass and carriers ability of projecting airpower on a given point at an opportune time were important factors to win the war, and when the Japanese finally realized the nature of the war it was too late: they virtually lost all their reserves of ships, merchantmen, planes and pilots.
If they understood it or not didn't really matter in all honesty. They lacked sufficient carriers left to attempt it regardless. At the start of the Campaign the US could bring four fully functional fleet carriers into action, plus a fifth in the Atlantic that was never even committed along with several of the larger first run escort carriers. Against this Japan could muster two Fleet carriers with still recovering air wings and a smattering of mismatched light carriers.
Japan in fact got very lucky to not have lost what little remained of their carrier fleet and can largely thank extremely good luck with submarine actions for that. Wasp was sunk at a critical moment, and Saratoga forced to withdraw likewise when she was hit effectively evening the odds for the Santa Cruz and Eastern Solomon actions. This was the only thing that put possible victory within there grasp in all honesty, but even with even odds they failed. They managed to sink Hornet, but one of their remaining carriers was mauled so badly in return it was out of action for the rest of the campaign. They then decided to waste what was left of the second's air wing flying against Henderson field from land bases and managed to loose nearly the entire thing sidelining that carrier too and effectively handing over complete sea control to the USN before 1942 was even over.
Most of the night actions where by and large irreverent to the outcome of the battle. The Japanese managed to inflict some notable damage ashore exactly once by bombardment, but with zero control of the sea during the day and no way to contest enemy carriers operating in it the US simply brought in more cargo ships and flew in more planes. In hindsight the attempts to block the Japanese bombardment forces were probably largely wasted effort that cost more then they were worth. That's a brutal calculus of course and not one any of the marines ashore might have appreciated, but in hindsight it appears true. It's further reinforced by the fact the FAR more massive bombardments in later assaults by the US repeatedly failed to seriously reduce enemy presence on the target islands.
Guadalcanal was a battle of supply, and by losing control of the sea by day by the late summer of 1942 Japan had already lost. Control of the sea by day meant the Japanese could not supply effectively since cargo ships where too slow to make the run through air attack range fully under darkness. Warships where never going to be able to supply a large enough force to displace the marines and so the entire battle was over. Japanese pigheadedness in putting more troops ashore to starve to death only served the enemy interest of attrition which the Japanese could not hope to sustain. By the same token though the American commanders probably let emotions cloud good judgement somewhat by their repeated night engagements to stop bombardments and resupply efforts that didn't really seriously threaten the marines by late summer. The surface actions with the Japanese fleet that never really accomplished anything useful and contributed nothing to the victory which had already been effectively attained by control of the sea during day via carrier and land based air.
Then again the argument could be made that the ships lost didn't really have anywhere else they would have been more useful and that the attrition that was inflicted did help reduce the Japanese fleet somewhat. Still "us it cause you've got it" tends to be pretty poor reasoning for a military operation in general and holding them back, perhaps for some intensive training with the forthcoming advances regarding radar and communications might well have served better in the coming offensive.
Both Midway and Guadalcanal were the main turning points of the Pacific War: in Midway, the Japanese lost four fleet carriers (and the heavy cruiser Mikuma) as well veteran pilots and technicians that definitely couldn't be quickly replaced (specially pilots, given the Japanese training system).
It also made the Japanese high command hesitant about deploying their battleships (with exception of the WW1-era Kongou-class) having lost a good chunk of air support. And even if Yamamoto's gamble was successful, the capture of Midway would be of little strategic value (as pointed out by other Japanese officers): it's proximity to American territory and the distance from the Japanese home islands would mostly just add more strain to the already over-stretched supply and communications lines (not helped by the fact there was no consensus on what steps to do next: invasion of the Aleutians, Australia... which usually ended up in half-baked compromises).
Despite the losses at Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy still had a considerable number of surface vessels prior to the Guadalcanal campaign and superior experience at night battles. But Yamamoto's hesitation to send his heavy surface units (the disaster of Midway as well his belief of a Mahanian decisive battle with battleships influenced him) and his tendency of splitting his forces into mutually non-supportive support groups (oxymoron intended) resulted in Japanese failure to break the American air power in the region.
And Tanaka's Tokyo Express not only failed to provide adequate supplies to the Imperial Japanese Army units, but it also resulted in the loss of valuable surface ships (specially destroyers) to the point Japan no longer had enough escorts to shield their remaining carriers, protect convoys against submarine attacks and sufficient strength (and experienced crewmen) to engage in surface battles.
Tk3997 said:
If they understood it or not didn't really matter in all honesty. [...]
The Japanese wanted a decisive battle against the Americans, and Guadalcanal was probably the decisive battle they wanted, but of course, even if they were sucessful in expelling the Americans out of Henderson Field, it would just stretch the war a few more months.
Imperial Japan's previous war experiences were against two decadent world powers: Qing China and the Russian Empire (First Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war), both had no choice but make concessions. And when the Americans proved to be much, much more prepared for combat and willing to fight until the end... well, no need to tell what happened next.
Fletcher was supposed to support the marines landing on Guadalcanal. But then the Japanese surprised the fleet and destroyed many ships in a night battle.
As a result, he ordered the carriers who were supposed to support the landing out of the area. (The US at this point of the war only had a handful of carriers and if they got destroyed, then its game over).
Need to say, the marines were pissed being left high and dry.
Not quite. Fletcher took his carriers out of the area prior to the Savo Island disaster, in response to air raids. However, the Japanese didn't exploit their victory at Savo to the fullest due to the belief he was still there, so it didn't make a big difference strategically whether he departed before or after.
The Marines were not happy with the Navy throughout the Guadal campaign, but I don't really fault Fletcher for leaving. Fleet carriers were like gold at that point.
Imperial Japan's previous war experiences were against two decadent world powers: Qing China and the Russian Empire (First Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war), both had no choice but make concessions. And when the Americans proved to be much, much more prepared for combat and willing to fight until the end... well, no need to tell what happened next.
Both had no choice because the rest of the world was either quietly (Russo-Japanese war), or actively (Sino-Japanese war) backing Japan up.
If every major nation across the globe were supporting Japan at WWII, like it was in 1900-1910, USA would have backed of too, will to fight or not.